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STUDENT COMMENTS
PRISON INDUSTRIES: A CASE FOR PARTIAL
PRIVATIZATION
DIANE M. HALLER*
The 1970's and 1980's have witnessed a renewed interest
in prison industries, or more specifically, private sector em-
ployment of prisoners within the prison itself. This revived
interest is reflected in the repeal of some of the state legisla-
tion which restricted the use of prisoner labor and the sale of
prisoner-made goods,' in Congressional legislation which en-
couraged the development of prison industries,' and in Chief
Justice Burger's plea for "factories with fences. ' '
Experts attribute the increased interest in prison indus-
tries to the escalating costs of prisons,4 the high degree of
* B.S. 1983, University of Utah; J.D. 1986, University of Notre Dame;
Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-86.
1. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
2. The Prison Industries Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-157, §
827, 93 Stat. 1215 (1979) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982))
exempted seven pilot projects from federal legislation which restricts the
use of prisoner labor and the marketability of prisoner-produced goods. See
infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
3. W. Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences?, Remarks at
the University of Nebraska, sponsored by the Lincoln Bar Association
(Dec. 16, 1981), reprinted in 8 NEw ENG. J. PRIsoN L. 111 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Factories with Fences]. Although the "Factories with Fences"
speech is perhaps the Chief Justice's best-known presentation, it is certainly
not his only speech which addressed prison reform-including prisoner la-
bor and prison industries. See also W. Burger, Remarks on Nightline (ABC
News, Show #812, June 19, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Remarks on Night-
line]; W. Burger, Remarks at the National Conference on "Factories with
Fences:" Prison Industries Approach to Correctional Dilemmas, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (June 18, 1984); W. Burger, Remarks at the Safer Foundation
Banquet, in Chicago (Jan. 26, 1984); W. Burger, We Refuse to be Responsible
for the People We Imprison, Address at the Annual Dinner of the National
Conference of Christians and Jews, in Philadelphia (Nov. 1972); W. Bur-
ger, Address to the National Conference on Corrrections, in Williamsburg
(Dec. 1971); W. Burger, No Man is an Island, Address at the Midwinter
Meeting of the American Bar Association, in Atlanta (Feb. 1970); W. Bur-
ger, A Proposal to the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, in
Dallas (Aug. 1969).
4. The 1982 operating cost per state prisoner ranged from $5,121
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
prisoner idleness,' and widespread public dissatisfaction with
the American prison system.6 In spite of the growing interest
in prison industries, however, state and federal legislation still
restricts the use of convict labor and the sale and transport of
prisoner-made goods.7
This article argues for private sector employment of
state prisoners in prison industries. Part I briefly surveys the
historical background of the use of convict labor in prison
industries and of private sector involvement in those indus-
tries. Part II examines three important justifications for pris-
oner labor and private sector participation: the promotion of
human dignity, economic necessity, and rehabilitation. Part
III then describes the trend toward, and the barriers to, pri-
vate sector participation in prison industries. The barriers in-
clude legislative restrictions and prohibitions, as well as those
barriers inherent in a prison setting, such as high inmate
turnover. Finally, Part IV recommends legislative changes to
encourage the full development of privately-run, profit-ori-
ented prison industries. Specifically, it argues that restrictive
legislation should be repealed and replaced by laws which
permit and encourage private-sector employment of prison-
ers while protecting the prisoners from abuse and
exploitation.
I. BACKGROUND
Prison industries were not an American invention; the
first prison industries evolved in England and Holland in re-
sponse to the developments of the sixteenth century: mercan-
tilism, an increasing demand for consumer goods, labor
shortages, high levels of vagrancy, capitalists' search for
profit-seeking enterprises, and the popularity of the Calvinist
to $22,748; construction cost per state prison bed ranged from $34,000 to
$110,000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 93 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BJS
REPORT].
5. In 1979, only ten percent of all state and federal prisoners were
employed in prison industries. G. FUNKE, B. WAYSON & N. MILLER, ASSESTS
AND LIABILITIES OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES 13, 20-21 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as ASSETS AND LIABILITIES].
6. This dissatisfaction resulted from the perceived failure of Amer-
ican prisons: treatment programs failed to lower recidivism rates while
prison costs continued to rise. See id. at 4-5; Factories with Fences, supra note
3; Schaller, Work and Imprisonment: An Overview of the Changing Role of
Prison Labor in American Prisons, 10 PRISON J. 3, 4 (1982).
7. See infra notes 19-24, 87-89 and accompanying text.
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work ethic.8 "Houses of correction" or "manufactories," run
by government officials, were built across Europe. Inmates
were employed by the government or by private
manufacturers. 9
Originally designed to combat vagrancy and promote the
goals of mercantilism, the houses of correction gradually
evolved into prisons as incarceration became the mode of
punishment. By the eighteenth century, the houses of correc-
tion were used primarily to inflict corporal punishment, and
no longer emphasized "industries." For example,
"[p]risoners carried huge stones from one place to another
and then back again, they worked pumps from which the
water flowed back to its source, or trod mills which did no
useful work." 10 These institutions had failed to realize their
expected profit, and the demand for productive prisoner la-
bor rapidly decreased."
During the Enlightenment, corporal punishment and ex-
ecution, rather than imprisonment, were the penal norm."
Suggested reforms of the European penal system included
provisions for prisoner labor.s As a result, prison industries
8. For a discussion of the historical development of prisoner labor
and prison industries during the sixteenth century, see T. ERIKSSON, THE
REFORMERS 8-17 (1976); M. GRtINHUT, PENAL REFORM 11-22 (1948); G.
RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 24-52
(1939); J. SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 70-82 (1976).
9. "The usual inmates were able-bodied beggars, vagabonds, idlers,
prostitutes, and thieves." G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 42.
In some instances, the entire house of correction was contracted out to a
private employer. Id. at 43.
10. Id. at 112.
11. For a discussion of the history of the houses of correction after
the sixteenth century, see T. ERIKSSON, supra note 8, at 18-49; M. GRONHUT,
supra note 8, at 23-42; M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN 13-113
(1978); G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 23-83.
12. Eighteenth century punishment practices are vividly described
in M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 11, at 14-43.
13. In 1704, Pope Clement XI founded the Hospice of St. Michael
in Rome, which included work in its program of correction for juvenile
delinquents; Beccaria advocated prisoner labor in On Crimes and Punish-
ments, published in 1764; Vilain XIII opened a house of correction in
Ghent in 1771 which implemented prisoner labor; Howard's The State of the
Prisons, published in 1777, recommended prisoner labor as part of a "total
institution;" the Penitentiary Act of 1779, drafted by Blackstone and Eden,
included a provision for "fixed hours" of work and for construction of
houses of correction (penitentiaries); the Quakers reformed the Walnut
Street Jail in Philadelphia through a program which included work in
1786; Bentham's Panopticon, published in 1791, even included architectural
plans for an industrial prison. For an overall view of these reforms, see id.
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were somewhat revitalized, but by the nineteenth century, a
variety of factors culminated in the demise of the houses of
correction. Among the contributing factors were an over-sup-
ply of labor, opposition from both industrialists and the
working class, lack of funding, inhumane working conditions,
prisoner abuse and exploitation, and changes in penal
theory. 14
In America, prison industries were part of the develop-
ment of the penitentiary system in the early nineteenth cen-
tury.1" During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, pris-
oners worked under various employment systems which
involved the public or private sector or both.1 6 The public
at 44-113. See also T. ERIKSSON, supra note 8, at 18-49. St. Michael's Hos-
pice is also described in M. GRONHUT, supra note 8, at 21; Sellin, The House
of Correction for Boys in the Hospice of Saint Michael in Rome, 20 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 533 (1929-30).
14. Rusche & Kirchheimer cite economic factors to explain the
demise:
The factory replaced the house of correction, for the latter re-
quired large outlays for administration and discipline. Free labor
could produce much more and it avoided the drain on capital in-
volved in the house of correction. In other words, the house of
correction fell into decay because other and better sources of
profit had been found, and because with the disappearance of the
house of correction as a means of profitable exploitation the possi-
ble reformatory influence of steady work also disappeared.
G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 95. Hawkins, on the other
hand, argues that "the elegant simplicity of the economic determinists'
road map is a poor guide to the itinerary actually followed. It is clear that
it was largely a matter of penal policy [which put an end to the develop-
ment of profit-seeking prison industries]." Hawkins, Prison Labor and
Prison Industries, 5 CRIME & JUST. 85, 93 (1983). Hawkins emphasizes that
concern for the lack of uniformity in the treatment of prisoners was one of
the "matters of penal policy." Id. at 93-95.
15. See T. ERIKSSON, supra note 8, at 50-72; D. ROTHMAN, THE Dis-
COVERY OF THE ASYLUM 79-108 (1971); J. SELLIN, supra note 8, at 138-44.
16. The private sector was not involved in three types of employ-
ment systems-the public account system, the state use system, and the
public works and ways system. In the public account system, the state acted
as a manufacturer and sold the goods on the open market; the state use
system simply limited the "market" to government agencies. Inmates em-
ployed in public works and ways built and repaired roads and public build-
ings. The chain gangs and prison farms are perhaps the more notorious
examples of the public works and ways systems. These state run systems are
more fully described in ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 5, at 9, 11-13;
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRISON LABOR 9-11 (1933); L. ROBIN-
SON, SHOULD PRISONERS WORK? 95-104 (1931); J. SELLIN, supra note 8, at
133-44, 163-76.
In the lease system, the private sector had full control over the prisoner
and the prison industry. The state "leased" the prisoner to the employer in
[Vol. 2
PRISON INDUSTRIES
sector systems gave the state full control over the prisoners'
lives, including their earnings, but state-run industries had
two major drawbacks: the state had to bear the financial risks,
and prisoners did not learn marketable skills.
Private sector industries, on the other hand, shifted the
financial risks away from the state and emphasized free enter-
prise and "free world" skills, but the state lost a certain
amount of its control over the prisoners. Unfortunately, pri-
vate sector involvement met considerable opposition. Com-
petitive manufacturers and unincarcerated labor opposed pri-
vate sector prison industries and pressed for Congressional
restrictions which severely curtailed the market for prisoner
produced goods, thus eliminating many prison industries and
decreasing employment opportunities for inmates. Prisoner
exploitation and inhumane working and living conditions
characterized both private and public sector prison
industries.
In 1885, nearly ninety percent of all American prisoners
were employed in prison industries, but-by 1979, the employ-
ment rate had dropped to only ten percent.1 7 Many factors
contributed to this decline: exploitation of prisoner labor in
the form of low wages and inhumane working conditions, la-
bor opposition during the Depression, and opposition from
return for payment for the inmate's labor. The profit-seeking emphasis of
the private employers resulted in severe prisoner abuse and exploitation:
It was a pernicious system which did nothing to reform offenders
and subjected them, temporarily or for life, to a form of chattel
slavery even worse than that from which blacks had been freed. It
began, grew, and flourished only because almost all who suffered
under it were ex-slaves whom the master class still thought of as
belonging to an inferior race. This also accounts for the indiffer-
ence toward the often shocking neglect and brutality of the lease
camps, the cause of such abnormally high death and morbidity
rates that official investigators in several states concluded that a
convict who survived five to seven years in the camps, or two years
in some of the lumber camps, could consider himself fortunate.
J. SELLIN, supra note 8, at 162. See also ASSESTS AND LIABILITIES, supra note
5, at 10-11; FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRISON LABOR, supra at
8-9; L. ROBINSON, supra at 87-90.
The contract and the piece-price systems combined publicly run prisons
with privately run industries. Under the contract system, private employers
contracted for inmates to work at or near the prison. The piece-price sys-
tem is a type of contract system, except the employer pays on a piece or
article basis. See generally ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 5, at 9-11;
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRISON LABOR, supra at 8-10; L.
ROBINSON, supra, at 90-95; J. SEI N, supra note 8, at 133-44, 163-76.
17. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 5, at 20-21.
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manufacturers who claimed that cheap prisoner labor con-
tributed to unfair competition.18
As a result of continuing opposition from labor and man-
ufacturers, Congress passed legislation which severely re-
stricted prison industries. The major provisions prohibit the
interstate transportation of prisoner-made goods for private
use1 9 and forbid the use of convict labor or convict-produced
materials in government contracts over $10,000.20 Prisoner-
made goods transported for government use must be in pack-
ages which are clearly marked to indicate that the goods are
prisoner-produced.2 1 States may forbid or restrict the trans-
portation, importation or sale of prisoner-made goods, in-
cluding those made in the state's own prisons.22 Other provi-
sions prohibit the postal service from purchasing equipment
or supplies manufactured by convict labors and forbid the
use of convict labor or convict-made materials in highway
construction.2
4
This restrictive federal legislation was somewhat amelio-
rated by the Free Venture Program and the Prison Industries
Enhancement Act of 1979.25 The Free Venture Program was
designed to develop a model for prison industries by provid-
ing funding to seven states to develop their own prison indus-
tries .2 These states have used the funds to develop industries
characterized by six "Free Venture" principles which emu-
late private-sector employment practices:
1. A full work day for inmate employees.
2. Inmate wages based upon productivity, with a base
wage significantly higher than payments available to
non-industries inmates.
18. See generally id. at 7-27; D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVE-
NIENCE 137-43 (1980). The decrease in the employment of prisoners is also
associated with increased participation in the state use and public works
and ways systems.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982).
20. 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1982).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1762 (1982).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 11507 (1982).
23. 39 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
24. 23 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1215, (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982)).
26. These states were Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Minne-
sota, South Carolina, and Washington. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE AD-
MINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPACT OF FREE VENTURE PRISON IN-
DUSTRIES UPON CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1-4 (1981)[hereinafter cited as
LEAA EVALUATION]. Twenty-one shops were evaluated in this report.
[Vol. 2
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3. Private sector productivity standards.
4. Responsibility for hiring or firing inmate workers
vested with industries staff.
5. Self-sufficient or profitable shop operations.
6. A post-release job placement mechanism.27
The Prison Industries Enhancement Act exempted up to
seven certified prison industry pilot projects from the federal
restrictions on interstate transportation of prisoner-made
goods and the use of prisoner labor or goods in federal con-
tracts.28 In 1984, Congress expanded the number of projects
to twenty.29 Six projects-five for adult offenders and one for
juvenile offenders-are currently certified under the Act.30
These projects include:
* a metal fabrication plant, near the Kansas State Peni-
tentiary, owned and operated by Zephyr Industries,
Inc.;
* a mechanical and electrical component assembly plant
at the Stillwater State Prison in Minnesota, owned
and operated by the Minnesota Department of Cor-
rections. Control Data Corporation contracts for this
work on a piece basis;
* a metal fabrication project, owned and operated by
the Minnesota Department of Corrections. Products
are sold in the private sector; and
* a printing and graphics shop at the Utah State
Prison, owned and operated by the Utah Department
of Corrections. Products are sold in the private
sector. 1
Despite the exemption from some restrictions, further
development of these types of industries is hampered by the
restrictive federal' laws. Further, many states still have laws
which prohibit or restrict the use of prisoner labor and the
marketing of prisoner-produced goods. 2 These restrictive
laws should be repealed and replaced by laws that permit and
27. Id. at 2. See also ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 5, at 39-64.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982).
29. Justice Assistance Act of 1984,--Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
609(K)(a)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat. 2102) (codified at
18 U.S.C.A. § 1761 (West Supp. 1985)).
30. The projects are in California (juvenile offender facility), Kan-
sas, Minnesota (two projects), Nevada and Utah. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSIS-
TANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE SECrOR/PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCE-
MENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (1985) [hereinafter cited as PIE PROGRAM].
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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encourage prison industries.
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRISON INDUSTRIES
The most viable arguments for prison industries focus on
the ethical foundations of the work ethic, the economic need
for prisoner labor, and the potential rehabilitative value of
prisoner labor. These multiple justifications for prisoner la-
bor help to explain the popularity and perceived feasibility of
prison industries as a correctional reform-there seems to be
an alleged justification to please everyone.3
A. Ethical Underpinnings: The Theology of Work
The theology of work historically has comprised the ethi-
cal foundation for convict labor and prison industries. This
theology of work, emphasized by the doctrines of Calvinism
and Catholic social teaching, continues to provide support for
prison industry development in the 1970's and 1980's.
The sixteenth century houses of correction were highly
influenced by the Reformation, especially by Calvinism's em-
phasis upon work." Calvin taught that God conferred the
-most eminent dignity upon work," and therefore, man was
created to work. 5 Because of its inherent dignity, work sancti-
fies man; through work, man shows his devotion to and love
for God. Idleness, according to Calvin, is a grave sin because
idleness does not reflect this love and devotion. Calvinism
emphasizes that man has both a right and a duty to work: a
right to be sanctified and a duty to pay homage to God by
working. Through work, man recognizes and respects the
purpose of human existence.
The duty to work provided the ethical foundation for
the efforts of houses of correction to combat vagrancy. The
reform programs instituted in the houses of correction com-
33. "[I]t is one of the few reforms capable of securing broad based
ideological support .... ." Cullen & Travis, Work as an Avenue of Prison
Reform, 10 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45, 47 (1984). Robinson
expressed the same view in 1931, even though public opposition to prison
industries was strong at that time: "Is there anyone who believes that pris-
oners should not work? Few will confess to any such opinion." L. ROBINSON,
supra note 16, at 3.
34. See M. GRONHUT, supra note 8, at 11-22. See also T. ERIKSSON,
supra note 8, at 16; G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 33-52.
35. 'A. BItLER, THE SOCIAL HUMANISM OF CALVIN 45 (1964). See also A.
DAKIN, CALVINISM 221-24 (1949); T. TORRANCE, CALVIN'S DOCTRINE OF MAN




bined the discipline of work with religious instruction (or bi-
ble reading), and corporal punishment. 6 Thus, in addition to
seeking profit, the houses of correction also sought to reha-
bilitate the inmates.
Catholic monasticism also influenced the concept of pris-
oner labor and prison industries. In the Middle Ages, clergy
members who had violated the law were confined in monas-
teries.3 7 Houses of correction run by the Catholic Church of-
fered the same three-pronged measure of discipline and re-
form as did their Protestant-oriented counterparts: hard
work, religious instruction and corporal punishment.3
While the emphasis of Catholic social teaching regarding
work has changed since medieval times, contemporary Catho-
lic social teachings continue to emphasize the right and duty
to work and point out that work is a part of human dignity
and the salvific process. 9 Specifically, work has a "threefold
moral significance." 40 First, work "embodies the distinctive
human expression and self-realization."4 It is an essential
part of human dignity and self-esteem.
[Work] corresponds to man's dignity, [it] expresses his
dignity and increases it. If one wishes to define more clearly
the ethical meaning of work, it is this truth that one must
particularly keep in mind. Work is a good thing for man-a
good thing for his humanity-because through work man
36. "[T]he use of religion as a means of inculcating discipline and
hard labor was an essential feature of these institutions everywhere." G.
RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 45. See also T. ERIKSSON, supra
note 8, at 8-17; J. SELLIN, supra note 8, at 70-82.
37. See T. ERIKSSON, supra note 8, at 4-6, 26-27.
38. At the Hospice of St. Michael in Rome, "[tihe juvenile offenders
worked together in the central hall, occupied in spinning and knitting,
chained by one foot, under a rule of silence and sometimes listening to
pious reading .... Whipping was a frequent penalty for 'past mistakes' as
well as for non-performance of the daily task." M. GRONHUT, supra note 8,
at 21.
39. See, e.g., Leo XIII, The Condition of Labor (Rerum Novarum) paras.
27-32 (1891); John Paul II, On Human Work (Laborem Exercens) nos. 6-10,
25 (1981); National Catholic Welfare Conference, A Statement on Man's Dig-
nity paras. 27-30 (Nov. 21, 1953), reprinted in 2 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 164, 169-70 (H. Nolan ed. 1984); Na-
tional Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S.
Economy paras. 97-107 (Second Draft), reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 257 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Second Draft]; R. CHARLES, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF
VATICAN II 312-19 (1982); J. CRONIN, CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
25, 34-35 (1965).
40. Second Draft, supra note 39, para. 98.
41. Id.
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not only transforms nature, adapting it to his own needs,
but he also achieves fulfillment as a human being and in-
deed in a sense becomes "more a human being.'' S
Second, work has moral significance because. it is "the ordi-
nary way for human beings to fulfill their material needs; ' 4 3
it is financially necessary, especially to support a family. Fi-
nally, "work enables people to contribute to the well-being of
the larger community."" As a matter of social justice, each
person has a duty, through work, to contribute to the com-
mon good.
These three moral aspects of work are clearly interre-
lated: the dignity and self-fulfillment of human work arise
from the ability of the individual to contribute to the support
and development of himself, his family and the community.
This theology depicts work as both a right and a duty. Be-
cause work is such an integral part of human dignity, each
person has a right to work and a right to contribute to society.
At the same time, each person has a duty to work, as a means
of support for both the worker's family and as a responsibility
to societal well-being.
These three moral aspects of work apply equally, if not
more so, to prisoners. Depriving a prisoner of the right to
work and thus of the dignity of work adds a demeaning and
demoralizing component to the already-imposed punishment
of incarceration. Moreover, incarceration without the right
to work denies prisoners the opportunity to perform their so-
cietal duty to work. As a result, prisoners cannot develop and
support themselves, their families, or the community.
The theology of work underlies the recent prison re-
forms proposed by the United States Catholic Conference
(USCC).45 These reforms seek to promote rehabilitation, im-
prove overall prison conditions, and correct "positive injus-
tices" in prisons, including "unsatisfying work experience. 41 6
According to the USCC, prison work, in order to promote
human dignity, must also be dignified. "The work to which a
resident is assigned should be-and appear to
be-worthwhile and compatible with the dignity of a human
42. John Paul 11, supra note 39, no. 9.
43. Second Draft, supra note 39, para. 98.
44. Id.
45. United States Catholic Conference, The Reform of Correctional In-
stitutions in the 1970s, in QUEST FOR JUSTICE 206 (1981) (statement issued in
November, 1973).
46. Id. at 212.
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being. Nothing is so devastating to human aspirations as a
work assignment which both parties know is really useless.""
The courts have looked to similar factors as those found
in a theology of work when interpreting the rights of prison-
ers.4 8 For example, in Laaman v. Helgemoe,49 the district court
reviewed prisoners' working conditions at the New Hamp-
shire State Prison and found that the lack of useful work con-
tributed to prison conditions which violated the prisoners'
constitutional rights. Experts at the trial, testifying about the
pervasive idleness at the prison, explained the underlying
ethical need for prisoner work: "Every person has a need to
contribute something of his being to a seemingly beneficial
task, regardless of the nature of the work. The more interest-
ing and constructive the work seems to be, the more personal
satisfaction the individual derives."50 The experts added that
the lack of work decreases inmates' self-esteem and self-confi-
dence and "leads to degeneration." 51 The court's order of
reform to the prison included the requirement that each pris-
oner be afforded the opportunity to perform useful work. 2
Chief Justice Burger has also supported prison industries
with arguments similar to those of the theology of work."
Three moral aspects of work underlie the Chief Justice's pro-
posals: work as a manifestation of human dignity and self-es-
teem; work as a necessary means of family and self-support;
and work as both a right and duty to contribute to the well-
being of society. Thus, the theology of work has continued to
provide ethical support for prison industries and also coexists
with the two other justifications for prison industries: eco-
nomics and rehabilitation.
47. Id. at 216.
48. See, e.g., Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977);
Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218 (D. V.I. 1976).
49. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977).
50. Id. at 293.
51. Id. "The experts confirmed the old saying that idleness is the
handmaiden of the devil."
52. Id. at 329. The experts had testified that "'makework' is only
slightly less destructive than pure idleness and that only 'useful work' or
'meaningful work' can help an inmate acquire the skills and habits neces-
sary for success upon release." Meaningful work was defined as "work
which teaches skills saleable outside the prison gates and which is both a
new psychological experience and a new motor activity." Id. at 294.
53. See generally Factories with Fences, supra note 3; Remarks on
Nightline, supra note 3, at 10.
1986]
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B. The Economic Need for Prison Industries
Economic considerations, usually profit motives, were a
major impetus for the development of the houses of correc-
tion in Europe and in the American penitentiary system.
Prison officials sought to reduce the cost of incarceration,
and employers (who sometimes were the prison officials)
sought profits. Unfortunately, these economic concerns fo-
cused greater attention on money than on the prisoners' wel-
fare: "[The inmates'] welfare, present or future, was given
little thought, because the cardinal aim of the regents,
merchants and manufacturers all, was to make the institution
profitable by exploiting the manpower of the inmates, the
cheapest available labor."" Prisoner exploitation and mis-
treatment resulted from prison labor systems which, for prac-
tical purposes, were operated solely for economic reasons, al-
though that may not have been the intent of the systems'
designers .5 The problems associated with economic motiva-
tions may be avoided if moral and rehabilitative considera-
tions remain primary. This is not to say, however, that eco-
nomic justifications and motivations have no role in the
development of prison industries.
The theology of work, as propounded by the U.S. bish-
ops, does not ignore the economic necessity of work. The
bishops explain that unemployment not only wastes "talent
and creativity" and harms the dignity of the individual, but
also has economic cost. Thus, if prisoners do not work, they
cannot financially support themselves or their families. As a
54. J. SELLIN, supra note 8, at 79. See also id. at 138-144. The convict
lease system had similar economic goals with similar consequences to the
prisoners:
What a lessee was interested in was maximum financial profit from
his management of the institution. This meant keeping mainte-
nance costs at a minimum by feeding and clothing the convicts as
cheaply as possible, hiring guards willing to work for substandard
wages or using prisoners in that capacity. It meant working the
prisoners from dawn to dusk and extracting their best efforts by
the threat or use of the ever-present whip of the overseer.
Id. at 143.
55. The idealistic aim of the earliest houses of correction, to
make them reformatories that would restore their inmates to soci-
ety trained in useful occupations and Christian morals, was hardly
realized . . . .As they spread over the continent [the houses of
correction] became state factories serving the mercantilistic poli-
cies of rulers more concerned with the balance of trade than with




result, families may have to turn to food stamps or other as-
sistance. Further, unemployed prisoners cannot contribute,
through taxes, to the financial well-being of the community. 56
Since convict labor has failed to reduce recidivism
rates,57 economic justifications for convict labor provide per-
haps the most practical rationale in support of prison indus-
tries. The revenues generated from convict labor can provide
financial support for the convict's family, pay victim restitu-
tion, and pay taxes. The major economic benefit of convict
labor, however, is simply that it may help reduce the escalat-
ing cost of incarceration. State prison operation costs have
risen to as high as $22,748 per prisoner per year and con-
struction costs are as high as $110,000 per prison bed.58
These costs loom even larger when one considers the 40.6%
increase in the number of state prisoners from 1980 to
1984. 59
The Prison Industries Enhancement Act, which encour-
ages the development of prison industries, includes provisions
that control the use of the funds generated from the indus-
tries. The Act specifies that prisoner wages are subject to de-
ductions for room and board, taxes, family support and vic-
tim restitution." Twenty states have similar laws.61 As of
March 1985, prisoners had earned a total of $2,975,167 in
the certified projects. Of those wages, $240,615 went to fed-
eral taxes, $54,504 went to state taxes, $302,621 reimbursed
the states for room and board, and $1,021,323 went to the
prisoners' families.62
56. "Jobless people pay little or no taxes, thus lowering the revenues
for cities, states and the federal government. At the same time, rising un-
employment requires greater expenditures for unemployment compensa-
tion, food stamps, welfare and other assistance." Second Draft, supra note
39, para. 141. The USCC reforms similarly emphasized the economic costs
of unemployed prisoners. United States Catholic Conference, supra note
45, at 216.
57. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
58. BJS REPORT, supra note 4, at 93.
59. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 1984, at 3 (1985).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(l)(A)-(D) (1982).
61. Sexton, Farrow & Auerbach, The Private Sector and Prison In-
dustries 29 (1985) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Private
Sector]. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and
Washington.
62. As of March 1985, earnings data was available for the projects
in Kansas (certified in July 1981), Minnesota - Control Data (certified in
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Because economics partially justifies prison industries, ef-
ficiency becomes a paramount concern. Government-run
prison industries, however, have tended to focus on the ther-
apeutic and rehabilitative aspects of work rather than on the
development of efficient, profit-earning industries.63 The pri-
vate sector's orientation toward business and profit would
more efficiently realize the economic goals of prison
industries.
Turning the operation of production facilities over to those
who are most familiar with such operations, and who have
already created a management structure and support system
to insure optimum efficiency in manufacturing processes,
therefore, is the most sensible path for government to fol-
low. In short, each party should be freed to do that which it
does best: government, to create and implement policy, and
business, to productively utilize materials in the manufac-
ture and delivery of goods and services."
The arguments favoring public control over prisoner la-
bor typically point to the inhumane working conditions and
"slave labor" which historically characterized private sector
involvement in prison industries. These arguments against
private sector involvement also emphasize the incompatibility
July 1981), Minnesota - metal fabrication (certified in July 1983) and Utah
(certified in June 1982). The cost data breaks down in the following way:
ROOM & FEDERAL STATE FAMILY
WAGES BOARD TAX TAX SUPPORT
KANSAS $920,887 $257,677 $122,044 $15,535 $121,188
MINNESOTA- 951,407 - 72,012 23,022 475,703
CONTROL DATA
MINNESOTA- 653,344 - 38,301 12,641 326,672
METAL
UTAH 449,529 44,944 8,258 3,306 97,760
TOTAL $2,975,167 $302,621 $240,615 $54,504 $1,021,323
PIE PROGRAM, supra note 30, at 2-5.
63. As Rothman explains, the eighteenth century penitentiary sys-
tem had this problem: "Officials were ill-prepared to manage their side of
the enterprise .... Their ignorance together with prisoners' ill will made
almost every prison ledger show a loss. Most institutions, rather than aban-
don convict labor, increasingly used it as a method of punishment." D.
ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 93. More recent government operations have
had similar results. See generally Schaller, supra note 6, at 7; Hawkins, supra
note 14, at 104.
64. Schaller, supra note 6, at 7.
[Vol. 2
PRISON INDUSTRIES
of profit-seeking with imprisonment, and claim that prisoner
labor should not be a "commodity to be exploited for
profit."1
In spite of the deplorable history of private involvement
with prisoner labor in the houses of correction and, more re-
cently, in the lease system, the private sector remains a logi-
cal participant in prison industries. The potential problems of
exploitation and inhumane working conditions are avoidable
through compliance with health, safety, and wage regula-
tions; both courts and state correction officials can ensure this
compliance. In determining safety and health standards, at
least one court has found that prisons and prison industries
must comply with the minimum guidelines of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration. 6 In the alternative,
prisons may have to comply with state health and safety
guidelines." At the very least, courts must guarantee that
prison industries do not violate the eighth amendment's pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishment.68
Wage guidelines present a much more controversial is-
sue. 9 Courts could require that prison industries comply with
the federal minimum wage requirement; however, state law
65. M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 11, at 112.
66. French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
67. Blake v. Hall, 469 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Mass. 1979), modified, 668
F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The courts have limited the use of
convict labor when necessary to protect the health and well-being of the
prisoner. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 816 (E.D. Ark.
1967), vacated on other grounds 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Ste-
phens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965). The courts have found
that idleness alone does not violate the eighth amendment. Byrd v. Vitek,
689 F.2d 770, 771 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d
480, 486 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); Hoptowit v.
Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559,
566-67 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981) (the court rec-
ognized that shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety and medical care are
"core areas in any Eighth Amendment claim."); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F.
Supp. 894, 908 (D. Or. 1982). However, idleness in addition to "other con-
ditions" may violate the eighth amendment, as indicated by a series of
cases dealing with the inhumane conditions at the Arkansas prisons. See,
e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), af'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971) (Holt II).
69. See, e.g., Minimum Wages for Prisoners: Legal Obstacles and Sug-
gested Reforms, 7 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 193 (1973). Wages are also discussed in
notes 92-98, infra, and accompanying text.
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may stipulate a wage rate or wage guidelines for prisoners.7
Wages, like the nature of the work itself, must reflect the dig-
nity of the individual; Catholic social teaching requires a
"fair" or a "living" wage to achieve this goal. 1 Because the
cost of living varies by locality, the Prison Industries En-
hancement Act may best ensure a fair wage by requiring that
it be relative to the locality .7
Health, safety and wage standards can help ensure that
prison industries do not exclude the values of a theology of
work, as they focus more practically on economic necessity.
These protective measures provide the final support for an
economic justification for prison industries.
C. The Rehabilitative Potential of Prison Industries
Rehabilitative justifications for prison industries contend
that incarcerated workers will develop habits which will ease
their transition into society upon release and thus reduce re-
cidivism. According to Chief Justice Burger:
[H]uman beings who are producing useful goods for the
marketplace-who are being productive-are more likely
to develop the self-esteem essential to a normal, integrated
personality . . . . [T]his kind of program could provide
training in skills and work habits that could make many
prisoners better able to cope with life on their return to
freedom."
Statistics, however, do not show that prison employment
reduces recidivism for inmates who work. Studies have shown
that the factors having the greatest influence on recidivism
exist at the time of incarceration, and include prior criminal
record, age at first arrest, and nature of the offense. There-
fore, as a general rule, programs or treatment occurring dur-
ing incarceration do not affect overall recidivism rates.7, An
70. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.30.227, 33.30.250(b) (1982); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2811 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-301(2)
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-183(2) (1981).
71. Second Draft, supra note 39, para. 102. See also Leo XIII, supra
note 39, para. 32.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982).
73. Factories with Fences, supra note 3, at 117-18.
74. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYS-
TEM 36-53 (1964); A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PA-
ROLE 23, 31-32 (1979). Studies do show a causal connection between unem-
ployment and crime; however, these studies conclude that prison programs
do not affect post-release employment. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EVALUATION,
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evaluation of one of the Free Venture programs showed that
participating inmates did not "develop better working habits,
• . . [did not] gain employment sooner after release and [did
"175not] earn higher wages ....
Although studies demonstrate that work has no overall
impact on recidivism, the studies do not suggest that work is
never rehabilitative. As the evaluation of the Free Venture
program pointed out, work "seemed to have a positive im-
pact on recidivism for some inmates.""6 Further, those studies
which examined the rehabilitative potential of convict labor
took place during an era of extensive federal and state legis-
lative restrictions on prisoner labor and prisoner-produced
goods. Studies of more current prison industries may pro-
duce different results. The problem would then become de-
termining a level of reduced recidivism necessary to support
the rehabilitation justification for prison industries." This
problem is magnified perhaps by the refusal of the courts to
BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POST RELEASE EMPLOYMENT PRO-
JECT: THE EFFECTS OF WORK SKILLS ACQUISITION IN PRISON ON POST-RELEASE
EMPLOYMENT AND RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS 2-5 (1985). The
Office of Research and Evaluation is currently conducting a study on the
effects of prison work on federal prisoners.
75. Free Venture Concept Evaluated, CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Oct. 12,
1981, at 7.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Chief Justice Burger tried to resolve this issue and upheld the
rehabilitation justification as follows: "If only 10 percent of those who
would otherwise return to prison do not, it would be worth the effort."
Factories with Fences, supra note 3, at 112. Similarly, a prison industries
study funded by the Justice Department concluded:
While the available evidence demonstrates that many rehabilita-
tive programs in the prison setting have not worked, it cannot and
should not be viewed as proof that present treatment programs in
general and prison work programs in particular cannot rehabili-
tate. This proposition is logically unverifiable in the positive sense.
Moreover, our study team has observed occasional programs
which do have outstanding records of rehabilitation. This does not
mean that imprisonment can continue to be justified on the prom-
ise or pretense of rehabilitation; given the available evidence, this
would be the height of folly. It does imply that so long as society
continues to incarcerate people it is in the social interest to con-
tinue to search for prison programs which do rehabilitate at least
some offenders.
NAT'L INST. L. ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUST., ANALYSIS OF PRISON INDUSTRIES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 3 (1978). However, even Chief Justice
Burger has admitted that the hopes for rehabilitation due to convict labor
"seem to have been based more on optimism than reality." Burger, Ex-
Prisoners Can Become Producers, Not Predators, NATION'S Bus., Oct. 1983, at
38, 39.
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find that inmates have a constitutional right to
78rehabilitation.
Greater private sector participation in prison industries,
however, may improve recidivism rates. From the perspective
of rehabilitation and reintegration, a private employer "of-
fers the prisoner a real bridge to the world of work outside
the prison."'7 9 Private employers present a "real world" at-
mosphere, and thus ease the prisoner's transition into society
upon release, especially if the industry within the prison is a
"branch plant." 80
Another aspect of the reformative potential of prisoner
labor is its effect on the prisoners' behavior while in prison.
Specifically, prison industries have been justified on the
ground that inmate labor results in greater prison tranquility
and fewer riots and uprisings, which are typically associated
with high levels of prisoner idleness." An evaluation of the
impact of the Free Venture shops showed that the program
had a positive impact upon the tranquility of the institutions
and upon the behavior of the inmates, as indicated by their
disciplinary records. 82
Finally, rehabilitation can logically support prisoner la-
bor when defined in the context of the theology of work.
Prisoner labor can help rehabilitate inmates in the sense that
78. Courts have repeatedly held that inmates have no enforceable
constitutional right to rehabilitative programs, including work. See Hopto-
wit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982); Battle v. Anderson, 564
F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 908 (D.
Or. 1982).
79. Schaller, supra note 6, at 7.
80. "These branch plants would be designed to produce the same
goods that the firms produce in normal operation, and they would teach
inmates the same skills that are useful 'outside.' " Singer, Incentives and the
Use of Prison Labor, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 200, 205 (1973).
81. See generally Cullen & Travis, supra note 33, at 56; Potuto, An
Operational Plan for Realistic Prison Employment, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 291.
82. LEAA EVALUATION, supra note 26, at 53-59, 66-68. The courts
also have recognized that idleness contributes to violence at prisons. See
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 293 (D. N.H. 1977)(experts testi-
fied that "full employment will result in vastly-improved inmate morale,
improved institutional operation and the avoidance of disruptive inci-
dents."); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 968 (D. R.I. 1977), affd
on other grounds, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839
(1980) ("[Idleness] breeds boredom and a quest for excitement, and . . it
is a major cause of the violence which has plagued the institution for
years."); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 326 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd and
remanded on other grounds, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), modified, 438 U.S.
781 (1978) (per curiam) ("Such unbroken activity increases boredom, ten-
sion and frustration, which in turn promote incidents of violence.").
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it may help restore dignity, self-esteem and confidence-even
though this may not be reflected in recidivism statistics. In-
mate rehabilitation, then, can be offered as a justification for
prisoner labor, when combined with the theology of work,
but because of the failure of inmate labor to reduce recidi-
vism rates, it cannot serve as the sole justification.
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PRISON INDUSTRIES
A. Trends
The 1970's and 1980's have seen a revival of private sec-
tor interest and activity in prison industries that should con-
tinue to grow. As of January 1985, the private sector was in-
volved in twenty-six prison industry projects at the state
prison level.83 This increased activity has been attributed to
various factors, including state legislation which encourages,
instead of restricts, private sector involvement, as well as de-
creased opposition from both labor and business." Model
state acts have included provisions that encourage private sec-
tor involvement in prison industries and call for repeal of re-
strictive legislation." Over the last ten years, nearly half of
the state legislatures have passed provisions encouraging pri-
vate sector involvement in prison industries.8 6 The current
state legislative positions are shown in the following
statistics:8 7
* Seventeen states specifically authorize private sector
employment in prisons, eight states prohibit it,
twenty-five states are silent on the matter;
83. Private Sector, supra note 61, at 2, 8.
84. The reasons for the change in attitude on the part of private
enterprise are summed up in Hawkins, supra note 14, at 108. See also Pri-
vate Sector, supra note 61, at 1-3, which also explains that the change in
attitude resulted from a redefinition of the focus of prison industries by
public officials-from rehabilitative devices to an' economic tool and a
means to generate revenue.
85. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISON-
ERS § 4.1 (Joint Comm. on the Legal Status of Prisoners, Tent. Draft 1977)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]; MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS
ACT § 4-804 (Uniform Law Commissioners 1979) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL ACT].
86. Private Sector, supra note 61, at 3.
87. Id. at 17-31. State legislation is also described in NAT'L INST. OF
CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR PRISON INDUSTRIES 25-
60 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES FOR PRISON INDUSTRIES]; NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS
11-31 (1985) [hereinafter cited as THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS].
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* Sixteen states allow the private sector to contract for
inmate goods or services, thirteen states prohibit it,
twenty-one states are silent;
* Twenty states allow open market sales of prisoner-
made goods, twenty-five states prohibit it,"8 five states
are silent.
These legislative trends were encouraged by Congress in
1979 when it passed the Prison Industries Enhancement
Act."9 While the Act does not require private sector partici-
pation, its exemption provisions clearly provide an incentive
for the private sector to participate in prison industries.
B. Barriers to Private Sector Participation
In spite of the recent trends, barriers still exist which se-
riously impair full participation by the private sector. The
primary impediment continues to be restrictive state and fed-
eral legislation which limits or prohibits prisoner labor and
the transportation and sale of prisoner-produced goods.
Another barrier to prison industries historically has been
opposition from labor and business. European guilds and
manufacturers strongly opposed the original houses of cor-
rection and manufactories.90 Manufacturers protested that
prisoner labor contributed to unfair competition because of
inordinately low wages. The guilds protested that prisoner la-
bor interfered with their control of the job market and re-
sulted in displacement. In the United States, the major pieces
of restrictive legislation were passed in response to similar op-
position, although organized labor also protested on grounds
of prisoner exploitation."
The Prison Industries Enhancement Act addresses the
concerns of labor and business by including the following
conditions for certification: (1) Inmates must receive competi-
tive wages relative to the locality, subject to deductions for
taxes, room and board, family support, and victim restitution;
(2) Inmates cannot be deprived of their right to other state
or federal benefits because of their participation; (3) Inmates
must participate voluntarily and agree in advance to the fi-
nancial arrangements of their employment; (4) Local labor
88. Comparatively, in 1973 44 states prohibited open market sales.
Jensen, Mazze & Miller, Legal Reform of Prison Industries: New Opportunities
for Marketing Managers, 12 AM. Bus. J. 173, 176 (1974-75).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982).
90. See G. RuSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 8, at 44-45.
91. See ASSETs & LIABILrriEs, supra note 5, at 22-27.
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organizations must be "consulted" prior to the development
of the project; and (5) The inmate employment must not cre-
ate labor displacement in the locality."
Several states have similar legislation designed to offset
the concerns of labor and business." For example, six states
have statutory provisions which stipulate that privately-oper-
ated prison industries may be opened only where substantial
labor displacement will not occur.94 Twelve states have provi-
sions which require that privately-employed prisoners be paid
a minimum or prevailing wage.95 Finally, eight states have
laws requiring that inmates who work for private employers
must do so voluntarily. 91
In addition to restrictive legislation and labor/business
oppostion, a final impediment to private sector involvement
in prison industries concerns the problems of operating a
business with prisoner labor: high turnover, lack of skilled
and trained employees, and interference with production due
to prison procedures, such as shake-downs, hearings, and
drug/alcohol therapy. Other prison-related problems may in-
clude transportation costs (due to the remote location of
many prisons) and the difficulty of attracting unincarcerated
supervisors to work at a prison.97 A final issue which has been
raised is whether the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to
prisoner employees. If so, potential private sector employers
may be discouraged by its minimum wage requirement."
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (1982).
93. See GUIDELINES FOR PRISON INDUSTRIES, supra note 87, at 25-60;
THE PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 87, at 11-31; Private Sec-
tor, supra note 61, at 15-39.
94. Private Sector, supra note 61, at 27. These states are Alaska,
Iowa, Indiana, Nevada, Oregon and Vermont.
95. Id. at 24. These states are Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah and
Washington.
96. Id. at 26-27. These states are Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, New Mexico, Tennessee, Utah and Washington.
97. The barriers resulting from the prison atmosphere are discussed
in Hawkins, supra note 14, at 103-105; Potuto, supra note 81, at 302; Pri-
vate Sector, supra note 61, at 12-13 (which also identifies prisoner manipu-
lation or "con games" as a disincentive to private sector participation in
prison industries).
98. See generally Private Sector, supra note 61, at 13. The Prison
Industries Enhancement Act only requires wages competitive with those
for similar work in that locality. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(1) (1982). The Joint
Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners recommended that
"[p]risoners should be governed by provisions comparable to those of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Prisoners should receive the same wages and be
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A variety of offsetting incentives can lessen the impact of
these barriers and thus encourage private sector participation
in prison industries. These incentives include tax breaks, gov-
ernment subsidies, capital equipment benefits, low cost utili-
ties and rent, and preferred access to government contracts."
Two states currently have statutory incentives for private em-
ployers at prisons: Indiana, which allows a tax credit; 00 and
Washington, which allows a preference on state contract bid-
ding. 101 The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing
and Corrections Act allows offsetting financial and service-
oriented incentives of "additional costs [incurred] because of
the nature and size of the confined-person work force or the
location of the facility." 102 The problem with this approach
lies in indentifying all the costs uniquely attributable to the
prison work force or the location of the prison.
To minimize the negative aspects of the prison routine,
one author has suggested the "elimination of many of the ar-
bitrary, unnecessary, and demeaning rules and regulations
governing the day to day existence of those incarcerated in
favor of institutional rules that emphasize productive activity
and efficient utilization of existing resources."' ' To induce
inmate cooperation in prison industries and thus further en-
courage private sector participation, some states provide sen-
tence reductions for good work performance.'" This ap-
proach has been criticized, however, on the grounds that it is
required to work no more than the number of hours that prevails in free
society for similar work .... ." STANDARDS, supra note 85, at § 4.2(a), (b).
99. See Sexton, The Industrial Prison: A Concept Paper, PRISON J., Au-
tumn-Winter 1982, at 13, 22; Singer, supra note 80, at 205.
100. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-6-2 (Burns Supp. 1985).
101. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.60.190 (1982).
102. The director of the prison facility is allowed to:
(1) provide services and other assistance to the private
enterprise;
(2) permit the private enterprise to supplement the confined-per-
son work force with other employees; and
(3) after obtaining approval by the [Governor] ...forgive pay-
ments to be made by the private enterprise, equivalent to the
unavoidable additional costs incurred by employing confined
persons.
MODEL AcT, supra note 85, § 4-805.
103. Schaller, supra note 6, at 8.
104. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-98a (West 1975); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 33-8-14 (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-54.1 (Supp.
1983). Some states also specify the conditions under which inmates forfeit




the wrong type of inducement to offer prisoners. 10 5
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article has argued that prisoners should work and
that private industry should employ those prisoners. Prisoner
labor may be justified by the theology of work and supported
by economic and rehabilitative considerations. This triad sug-
gests that prisoner labor may be a morally compelling, politi-
cally feasible and a socially acceptable alternative to prisoner
idleness.
State legislative changes reflect increasing public support
for private sector employment of convicts in prison indus-
tries. Given this public support, the question then becomes
what remains to be done to encourage maximum private sec-
tor participation in prison industries, consistent with the
overriding need to protect the prisoner from exploitation,
and to promote human dignity and rehabilitation.
The first step should be the repeal of state and federal
legislation which restricts the use of prisoner labor or the sale
and transport of prisoner-made goods. This legislation should
be replaced by provisions which provide incentives for pri-
vate sector employers, such as tax breaks or preferences on
government contracts. Incentives should also be included for
prisoner participation; the most common would be sentence
reduction for good work performance. Legislation must also
include health, safety and wage standards which are enforcea-
ble by appropriate government agencies. Both the courts and
the state corrections agency would oversee the prison indus-
tries operations to protect the rights of the prisoners and pre-
vent exploitation of convict labor at the hands of private par-
ties. Finally, legislation should include provisions which
would prevent the private sector from establishing prison in-
dustries in areas where substantial labor displacement is likely
to occur.
105. Singer, supra note 80, at 201.
19861

